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nlargement has often been hailed as the EU’s most effective external policy. Indeed, 
the transformative power of the pre-accession process has brought remarkable reform 
and modernisation, especially in the countries of southern, central and eastern Europe. 
It has helped to expand the zone of peace and prosperity across much of the continent. But 
the politics of inclusion and harmonisation only work for countries that have a real interest 
in EU membership. The case of Iceland clearly shows the limits of the Union’s power of 
attraction. 
Blowing hot and cold  
In its coalition agreement of May 21st, Iceland’s new centre-right government decided to 
freeze accession negotiations with the European Union until Icelanders vote in a referendum 
on whether they want talks to continue or not. This approach reflects the current eurosceptic 
mood in Iceland, expressed in the parliamentary elections of April 27th, which inflicted on 
the pro-EU Social Democratic Alliance (13.5% of the vote) the biggest defeat of any ruling 
party in the country since independence from Denmark in 1944. The SDA/Left-Green 
coalition’s combined share of the vote fell from over 50% to under 25%. The vote was 
favourable to the Independence Party (26.5%), which dominated Icelandic politics before 
2009, and to the Progressive Party (24.4%), its main rival and partner in the new coalition. 
Voters have thus returned the eurosceptic parties that led Iceland to its economic meltdown. 
While in power, they pushed to privatise the banks and liberalise the financial sector. 
Iceland’s banking-sector assets grew from about 96% of GDP in 2000 to roughly 800% by the 
end of 2006, and were worth around ten-times its GDP on the eve of the crisis. The 
Independence Party was in office when Iceland’s commercial banks collapsed in 2008 as a 
result of the global financial crisis, leaving the country with massive debts. The centre-right 
government collapsed in January 2009 and was replaced in the parliamentary elections of 
April 2009 by the country’s first-ever left-wing coalition government, which had argued that 
joining the EU would provide long-term economic security for Iceland. It is this government 
that applied for EU membership on 16 July 2009, in the midst of a banking and economic 
crisis. 
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Formal EU accession negotiations began on 17 June 2010, the day on which EU candidate 
country status was formally granted by the European Council. Iceland then made steady 
progress in the accession process. By April 2013, 27 (out of 33) negotiation chapters had been 
opened; 11 had already been closed. The talks had not yet touched upon the sensitive 
chapters of energy, agriculture and fisheries, however. The latter, in particular, is something 
of an emblem for Icelandic voters, who fear that their fishing rights would be eroded by 
demands from Brussels to grant EU fishing vessels access to Icelandic waters. 
As a result of the $2 billion IMF bail-out package extended to Iceland in 2009 and painful 
reforms taken to stabilise the economy, the island emerged from recession in late 2011. Many 
observers saw the country’s spectacular recovery as an example for other Western European 
economies. But Icelanders have not enjoyed the tough love of devaluation, austerity and 
capital controls over the past four years. Public support for the government has decreased 
dramatically from 2011 onwards, as evidenced, inter alia, by the negative outcome of two 
referenda over drafts of a loan agreement proposed after heavy pressure from the 
Netherlands and the UK. The latter used anti-terrorism legislation against Icelanders to 
freeze their assets in Britain in an attempt to settle the Icesave dispute. Icelandic taxpayers 
were saved and public opinion was vindicated in a judgment of the EFTA Court of 28 
January 2013, which cleared Iceland of all charges. The troubles of the eurozone have also 
undermined the left-wing parties’ pro-EU arguments. 
In the run-up to the elections in April, the outgoing government decided to put on hold 
negotiations over the “difficult” chapters relating to fisheries, agriculture, right of 
establishment and services and on the free movement of capital, and not to take political 
decisions related to the EU. However, lower-level, technical discussions continued. After the 
elections, the European Commission stated that it was prepared to continue with the same 
dual-track approach unless the new government gave notice otherwise. This has now been 
ruled out in the new coalition accord, which signals a return to Iceland’s conservative 
political tradition. 
Better out than in? 
The centre-right parties now say that Iceland would have been worse off as a member of the 
EU and that devaluation and capital controls have helped to bring recovery sooner than for 
the eurozone’s basket-cases. The Independence Party believes the country’s future is best 
served by staying in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), of which Iceland has been 
a member since 1972.  EFTA has served as a long-term alternative to EU membership, also 
for countries like Switzerland, Norway and Liechtenstein, without formally excluding a 
potential future accession to the EU. Like Norway and Liechtenstein, Iceland is also a 
member of the European Economic Area (EEA), which was established in 1994 to form a 
common economic space with EU member states. Moreover, its citizens enjoy the Schengen 
free movement regime. 
As in Norway, the ‘loss of sovereignty’ argument has dominated public discourse in Iceland. 
This is astonishing, considering that EU accession would in fact grant Iceland voting status 
in the Union’s decision-making machinery, while within the EEA framework it remains 
technically obliged to swallow the majority of EU acquis without any real participation in its 
adoption. However, the appeal the EU once held among countries seeking economic stability 
and access to free trade is diminishing as the Union fails to emerge from its crisis. The UK is 
openly questioning its allegiance to the EU, while other members, like Denmark, have 
distanced themselves more clearly from the goal of euro adoption to protect their economies. 
Iceland now enjoys faster economic growth than the EU average. Eurosceptics ask why 
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Recent opinion polls suggest that most Icelanders are indeed against joining the EU. By the 
same token, however, a majority of those polled are in favour of continuing accession talks.1  
These results and those of earlier polls show that Iceland’s relationship with the EU is a 
deeply divisive issue within the country. Although no date for the referendum has been set, 
the new centre-right coalition may thus want to settle this matter as soon as possible. Should 
there indeed be a majority in support of continuing negotiations, then Iceland’s accession 
process will become a complicated and muted affair in the hands of an anti-EU membership 
coalition government. 
Consequences of an Icelandic ‘Nei’ 
Rejection of EU membership would be nothing new. Voters in Norway already delivered 
this verdict in a nationwide referendum in September 1972. They did so again in November 
1994, when they were asked to confirm the EU Accession Treaty that was negotiated and 
signed in parallel with Sweden, Finland and Austria, which did proceed to membership in 
1995. While painful for both the incumbent government and the EU, it has not otherwise 
hindered the development of EU-Norway relations. Neither has it closed the door to future 
potential membership of the country. After all, the EU membership clause of Article 49 TEU 
leaves open the possibility of re-application. Hence Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle’s 
recent statement that  
“[t]he European Commission continues to be convinced that the EU accession of 
Iceland would be of mutual benefit and remains committed to accompanying Iceland 
on its path towards EU membership.”  
The current developments in Iceland cast a cool shadow over the EU’s parade in welcoming 
Croatia as the 28th member state on July 1st. Iceland’s decision to freeze its accession process 
may also have a negative impact on Montenegro, which risks losing a valuable advisor in its 
accession negotiations with the EU. More generally, and contrary to Olli Rehn’s prediction 
that the prosperous and well-integrated North Atlantic country would join the EU together 
with Croatia in 2011, the sorry state of Iceland’s accession process raises the question 
whether the EU is devoting enough effort to communicating the benefits of enlargement to a 
generally undecided but increasingly sceptical audience. The Icesave dispute highlighted a 
lack of sensitivity on the part of the EU to what was a very emotional issue for Iceland. 
Lessons could be drawn here – if and when EU accession negotiations resume. 
                                                      
1 Survey by the University of Iceland of 23 April 2013 (http://www.ruv.is/frett/meirihluti-vill-halda-
afram-vidraedum).  